

Time-Varying Business Volatility, Price Setting, and the Real Effects of Monetary Policy

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Motivation – Research Question


What is the (empirical) relationship between:

business volatility

⇒ frequency of price setting

⇒ effectiveness of monetary policy

Motivation



Great Recession in Germany:

- ▶ Average firm-level volatility tripled compared to pre-recession mean
- ▶ Average frequency of producer price changes increased from pre-recession mean of 31.6% to 38.6%

→ Link between firm-level volatility and price setting?

Why do we care?

- ▶ In a large class of monetary models:
frequency of price adjustment / degree of nominal rigidity
affects monetary non-neutrality
 - ▶ If heightened business volatility leads to higher price flexibility
in recessions
- Monetary policy might be less effective when needed most

Some rudimentary “theory”

- ▶ To the extent that heightened business volatility also leads to heightened business uncertainty
 - firms may want to “wait and see”
 - refrain from adjusting their prices
 - prices become endogenously more sticky
- ▶ Heightened business volatility
 - firms are hit by larger shocks
 - in certain imperfect information and learning environments a more volatile business situation might lead to more frequent information updating
 - price adjustment of firms more likely
- ▶ Sign of overall effect is an empirical question!

Outlook

1. Measuring firm-specific volatility
2. Empirical analysis
3. Model evidence
4. Conclusion
5. Robustness

Idiosyncratic volatility measures

- ▶ IFO Business Climate Survey (IFO-BCS): monthly firm survey for Germany
- ▶ Here: West-German manufacturing sector from 1980-2011 (~ 2500 firms of all sizes)
- ▶ 4 business volatility measures derived from IFO-BCS
 - ▶ 2 “**qualitative**” volatility measures
 - ▶ 2 “**quantitative**” volatility measures
- ▶ Based on Bachmann, Elstner and Sims (2013) and Bachmann and Elstner (2013)

Why the IFO survey?

- ▶ Survey of actual decision-makers, not, e.g., outside analysts
 - capture also uncertainty at the firm level
 - should also capture a “wait-and-see” effect
- ▶ Highly confidential: can only be accessed under strict non-disclosure agreements
 - less likely to suffer from strategic behavior
- ▶ Unique feature of German IFO-BCS:
 1. allows us to construct firm-specific volatility measures
 2. contains information on price setting of the same firms
 3. includes many firm-specific variables that allow us to control for first-moment effects

Construction of qualitative volatility measures

Use questions concerning firm-specific production expectations and realizations

1. Production expectation

“Our domestic production activities with respect to product XY will: increase, roughly stay the same, decrease.”

2. Production realization

“Our domestic production activities with respect to product XY have: increased, roughly stayed the same, decreased.”

Construction of qualitative volatility measures

Let's consider a hypothetical one-month example

Table : Possible Expectation Errors - One Month Case

Expectation in $t - 1$	Realization in t		
	<i>Increase</i>	<i>Unchanged</i>	<i>Decrease</i>
<i>Increase</i>	0	-1	-2
<i>Unchanged</i>	+1	0	-1
<i>Decrease</i>	+2	+1	0

- ▶ Production expectation is three months (one quarter) ahead; need to take this into account

Construction of qualitative volatility measures

- 1) Absolute forecast error as proxy for idiosyncratic volatility:


$$ABSFE_{i,t}^{qual} = |FE_{i,t+3}^{qual}|$$

- 2) 3-quarter rolling window standard deviation (Comin and Mulani, 2006; Davis, Haltiwanger, Jarmin, and Miranda, 2006)

$$STDFE_{i,t}^{qual} = \frac{1}{3} \sqrt{\sum_k \left(FE_{i,t+3+k}^{qual} - \overline{FE}_{i,t+3}^{qual} \right)^2}$$

- ▶ *Assumption:* Volatility means uncertainty at time of forecast (somewhat standard in the literature since Bloom, 2009)
- ▶ *STDFE* controls better for first moment effects (large shocks), but it leads to fewer observations
- ▶ Do robustness checks with respect to timing and window size

Evolution of qualitative volatility measures



- ▶ Time-series correlation coefficient: 0.89
- ▶ Pooled Spearman correlation coefficient (firm level): 0.52

Construction of the quantitative measures

- ▶ $u_{i,t}$: level of capacity utilization (quantitative)
- ▶ Production relation

$$y_{i,t}^{act} = u_{i,t} y_{i,t}^{pot}$$

$$\Delta \log y_{i,t}^{act} = \Delta \log u_{i,t} + \Delta \log y_{i,t}^{pot}$$

- ▶ Need: capacity utilization change is a production change, i.e. $\Delta \log y_{i,t}^{pot} = 0$
 - use only firms with no expected change in *technical capacity* and *employment* in prior period (two survey questions available)
- ▶ Now looking at firms with no expected change in *production*
 - $\Delta \log u_{i,t}$: production expectation error of firm i in t
- ▶ Can capture only volatility with respect to shocks that do not change the firms' potential output

Quantitative measures

- ▶ Production Expectation error of firm i in t :

$$FE_{i,t}^{quan} = \Delta \log u_{i,t}$$


- 1) Absolute forecast error:

$$ABSFE_{i,t}^{quan} = |FE_{i,t+3}^{quan}|$$

- 2) 3-quarter rolling window standard deviation:

$$STDFE_{i,t}^{quan} = \frac{1}{3} \sqrt{\sum_k \left(FE_{i,t+3+k}^{quan} - \overline{FE}_{i,t+3}^{quan} \right)^2}$$



Comparison between quantitative and qualitative measures



- ▶ Time-series correlation coefficient: 0.62
- ▶ Pooled Spearman correlation coefficient: 0.65

Empirical analysis

- ▶ Recall: want to analyze effects of heightened idiosyncratic volatility on price-setting of firms
- ▶ IFO-BCS: price statements at monthly frequency
 - transform to quarterly frequency
- ▶ Binary dependent variable: *price change*
 - equals 1 if firm i states at t that it changed its price in at least one of the last three months



Business Cycle Properties of Frequency of Price Changes

Dependent variable: Share of price change

	PPI	CPI
Non-Recession Mean	0.3128***	0.4366***
Recession Dummy	0.0271***	0.0459***

- ▶ *Countercyclicality of PPI*: non-recession mean 31.28%, recession mean 33.99%
- ▶ *Recession of 08/09*: Average frequency of producer price changes increased from 31.6% to 38.6%
- ▶ Confirm results in Vavra (2013) as well as Berger and Vavra (2011) for US CPI data

Empirical analysis

- ▶ Estimate probability of observing a price change
- ▶ Price-setting equation for firm
 - ▶ Taylor dummies
 - ▶ Sector dummies
 - ▶ Time-fixed effects
 - ▶ Firm-specific variables
- ▶ Quarterly pooled probit model (Benchmark)

$$P(y_{i,t} = 1 | \mathbf{x}_{i,t}) = \Phi(\mathbf{x}_{i,t} \mathbf{b})$$

Discussion of Controls

- ▶ Taylor dummies: capture (mechanical) time-dependent pricing
- ▶ Time-fixed effects: *aggregate demand* effects
- ▶ Costs, technical capacity: *supply side* effects
- ▶ Business expectations, expected employment: *news* effects
- ▶ Orders, capacity utilization: *idiosyncratic demand* effects

→ Want to control as best as possible for first-moment effects!

Baseline empirical results

Table : Absolute production expectation error

Dependent variable: Price change				
	no firm-specific var.		incl. firm-specific var.	
ABSFE ^{qual}	0.012***		0.008***	
ABSFE ^{quan}		0.097***		0.092***
Observations	249,363	62,982	198,291	55,370
Pseudo R-squared	0.121	0.131	0.133	0.137

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Baseline empirical results

Table : Rolling window standard deviation

Dependent variable: Price change				
	no firm-specific var.		incl. firm-specific var.	
STDFE ^{qual}	0.040***		0.019***	
STDFE ^{quan}		0.235***		0.182**
Observations	231,332	16,239	184,756	14,458
Pseudo R-squared	0.124	0.162	0.134	0.167

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Baseline empirical results

- ▶ Heightened volatility increases the probability of a price change, though the effect is small
- ▶ For $ABSFE^{qual}$ and $STDFE^{qual}$ only the sign is interpretable
- ▶ Prices are about 0.1 percentage points more likely to change when volatility changes by one percentage point ($ABSFE^{quan}$)
- ▶ To put this into perspective: volatility in the Great Recession increased by 7.6 percentage points, and so did (roughly) the frequency of price adjustment. The impact of volatility falls by an order of magnitude short!
- ▶ Cost changes matter for price changes, so do changes in demand and news


Model - Overview

- ▶ *Empirical results*: increase in firm-specific volatility leads to an increase in the probability of a price change
- ▶ What are the consequences for the effectiveness of monetary policy?
- ▶ Calibrated New Keynesian model as in Gali (2008)
- ▶ Price setting is constrained à la Calvo (1983)
- ▶ In this model: induced price rigidities as only source of monetary non-neutrality
- ▶ Really just meant as a (slightly more sophisticated) first-pass back-of-the-envelope calculation

Model experiments

- ▶ Study the output impulse response to a 25 basis point monetary policy shock (stimulative) in *five* scenarios:
- ▶ Baseline: Calvo parameter determined by pre-08/09-recession mean of 31.6%
- ▶ 4 experiments: unforeseen, once-and-for-all and permanent increase in the Calvo parameter
 1. Total Great Recession increase in average price setting frequency to 38.6%
 2. Conditional, volatility-induced increase in price setting frequency to 32.3% (re-estimate on the pre-crisis sample)
 3. Upper bound of conditional, volatility-induced increase in price setting frequency to 32.8% (maximum over all robust. checks)
 4. Counterfactual: Large price flexibility change between time of very low and very high price setting frequency in the sample ($\Delta \approx 18$ percentage points)

Results



Model experiments – summary

- ▶ Total Great Recession increase in average price setting frequency: **17%** loss in output-stabilization effectiveness
- ▶ Conditional, volatility-induced increase in price setting frequency: **1.6%** loss
- ▶ Upper bound of conditional, volatility-induced increase in price setting frequency: **2.9%** loss
- ▶ Counterfactual: Large price flexibility change between time of very low and very high price setting frequency in the sample: **43%** loss

Current model extension

- ▶ Take the model more seriously
- ▶ Currently, building heterogeneous firm menu cost model
 - idiosyncratic volatility at firm level
 - more realistic price setting/rigidities
- ▶ Match the model to our estimated elasticity
- ▶ German Statistical Office gave us access to micro data underlying producer price index
 - allows moment matching to firm-level price data

Conclusion

- ▶ Heightened business volatility increases the probability of a price change, though the effect is small:
- ▶ We confirm the sign of the relationship predicted by the theoretical literature
- ▶ Deliver a new moment (elasticity) between volatility and price setting frequency that monetary models that study the effects of time-varying volatility should match
- ▶ Effects of this increase in firm-level volatility on monetary policy rather are small, at least for conventional monetary policy in a simple NK model

Robustness I

Dependent variable: Price change								
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
Volatility proxy at time of realization (pooled probit model)								
ABSFE ^{qual}	0.022*** (0.001)				0.008*** (0.001)			
ABSFE ^{quan}		0.187*** (0.021)				0.111*** (0.020)		
STDFE ^{qual}			0.017*** (0.002)				0.006*** (0.001)	
STDFE ^{quan}				0.031 (0.019)				0.006 (0.012)
Unexpected price changes (pooled probit model)								
ABSFE ^{qual}	0.008*** (0.001)				0.005*** (0.001)			
ABSFE ^{quan}		0.083*** (0.015)				0.068*** (0.016)		
STDFE ^{qual}			0.028*** (0.002)				0.019*** (0.002)	
STDFE ^{quan}				0.218*** (0.064)				0.202*** (0.072)

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Robustness Checks II

Dependent variable: Price change								
	Non-recession				Recession			
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
ABSFE ^{qual}	0.009*** (0.001)		0.004*** (0.001)		0.010*** (0.002)		0.005** (0.003)	
ABSFE ^{quan}		0.063*** (0.015)		0.047*** (0.014)		0.078** (0.032)		0.064 (0.041)
STDFE ^{qual}	0.028*** (0.003)		0.012*** (0.002)		0.045*** (0.004)		0.023*** (0.004)	
STDFE ^{quan}		0.228*** (0.077)		0.148** (0.069)		0.120 (0.137)		0.106 (0.136)

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Robustness Checks III

Dependent variable: Price change				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Volatility based on production changes				
ABS ^{quan}	0.100*** (0.017)		0.095*** (0.021)	
STD ^{quan}		0.151*** (0.049)		0.108** (0.053)
Volatility based on capacity utilization changes				
ABS ^{quan}	0.120*** (0.010)		0.101*** (0.012)	
STD ^{quan}		0.211*** (0.018)		0.154*** (0.019)
Qualitative production change				
ABS ^{qual}	0.028*** (0.001)		0.016*** (0.002)	
STD ^{qual}		0.049*** (0.003)		0.022*** (0.003)

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Robustness Checks IV

Dependent variable: Price change				
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
(a) Control function approach				
ABSFE ^{qual}	0.012*** (0.002)		–	
ABSFE ^{quan}		0.099*** (0.024)		–
(b) 5-quarter rolling window standard deviation				
STDFE ^{qual}	0.035*** (0.003)		0.016*** (0.002)	
STDFE ^{quan}		0.191 (0.132)		0.032 (0.132)

*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Robustness Checks V

Dependent variable: Price change

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Monthly model				
ABSFE ^{qual}	0.004*** (0.001)		0.002** (0.001)	
STDFE ^{qual}		0.012*** (0.001)		0.004*** (0.001)

Volatility measure as dummy variable

ABSFE ^{qual}	0.017*** (0.002)		0.010*** (0.003)	
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*** $p < 0.01$, ** $p < 0.05$, * $p < 0.1$

Asymmetric Price Response

	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)
Dependent variable: Price increase				
ABSFE ^{qual}	0.008*** (0.002)		0.007*** (0.002)	
STDFE ^{qual}		0.017*** (0.003)		0.009** (0.002)
Dependent variable: Price decrease				
ABSFE ^{qual}	0.008*** (0.001)		0.003*** (0.001)	
STDFE ^{qual}		0.013*** (0.002)		0.004*** (0.001)

*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

- ▶ Heightened volatility increases probability of price increases and price decreases
 - individual prices are more dispersed in times of higher volatility
 - another indication that what we measure is (mostly) volatility and not simply large first moment shocks